Johan van Benthem (Amsterdam & Stanford) Rational Dynamics: Game-theoretic Equilibria as Logical Fixed-Points of Repeated Announcements

"Rational Dynamics: Game-theoretic Equilibria as Logical Fixed-points of Repeated Announcements"

Johan van Benthem

Amsterdam & Stanford

Many of the current contacts between logic and game theory have to

do with explaining the emergence and stability of game-theoretic

equilibria in terms of epistemic assumptions. In this talk, we

analyze game-theoretic equilibria as arising in the limit from

repeated announcements by players of their own rationality. This

idea is made precise in a dynamic logic of information update. More

technically, this analysis leads to connections between different

notions of game equilibrium and different fixed-point logics:

monotonic or inflationary.

See `Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games',

ILLC Tech report, January 2003, http://www.illc.uva.nl

">http://www.illc.uva.nl