Solomon Feferman, Philosophy and Mathematics Departments, "Godel vs. Turing on Minds and Machines"
ABSTRACT:
Godel's incompleteness theorem (1931) is the most famous result of all
time in mathematical logic. Its significance has been seen as stretching
far beyond the fields of logic and mathematics to the very nature of the
human mind and its potentialities, but such claims are very controversial.
The theorem itself tells us that for any consistent mathematical axiom
system S there are simple arithmetical statements which are true but
unprovable in S. One view of the significance of this result is that
there are essential limits to human knowledge, since mind is the product
of the brain, and all of the brain?s activities (including proving
theorems in axiomatic systems) may be modeled in computational terms.
But
other philosophers and mathematicians have advanced an opposite view:
Godel's theorem shows that mind surpasses anything that can be modeled in
terms of computing machines, and is thus potentially unlimited. In this
talk I will present and critique Godel's own unusual formulation of the
issues involved.
BIO:
Solomon Feferman is Professor of Mathematics and Philosophy, Emeritus, at
Stanford University. He is the author of numerous articles on logic
and the foundations of mathematics, and of _In the Light of Logic_
(Oxford University Press 1998), editor-in-chief of the _Collected Works
of Kurt Godel_ (Vols. I-V, Oxford University Press, 1986-2003), and
co-author with Anita B. Feferman of _Truth and Consequences: The life
and logic of Alfred Tarski_ (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
Feferman is the recipient of the Rolf Schock Prize for Logic and
Philosophy for 2003.